There is Snowflake ( in Whonix ™ wiki) but snowflake is not obfuscated.Tor network has been widely used for protecting the privacy of users while accessing various online services. Use a prime order group instead of this nonsense especially if youĪt time of writing obfs4 is the only obfuscation protocol listed on /options and there are no better alternatives available for traffic obfuscation, to hide the fact that a user is using Tor. People should also have listened when I told them repeatedly that there It for anything at this point, and no one should have been using itįor anything for the past however many years since I first started Obfs4, and it's shelf-life expired years ago. Honestly, it is possible to create a better obfuscation protocol than Īs Yawning Angel, founder and maintainer of the traffic obfuscator obfs4 pluggable noted: VPNs and SSHs are vulnerable to an attack called website traffic fingerprinting. Using a VPN or SSH does not provide a strong guarantee of hiding Tor use from the ISP either. This fact is only mentioned here because proxies are constantly (falsely) suggested as a solution whenever this topic comes up in public arenas. This means the ISP can still clearly see that connections are made to the Tor network. The connection between the user and the proxy is unencrypted and this applies to all proxies: http, https, socks4, socks4a and socks5. It is impossible to safely use a proxy to hide Tor. An example threat model includes a DPI device with limited time to make a classification choice - so the hiding is very specific to functionality and generally does not take into account endless data retention with retroactive policing. However, they do not claim to hide that you are using Tor in all cases but rather in very specific cases.
Some pluggable transports may seek to obfuscate traffic or to morph it. Using private and obfuscated bridges alone does not provide strong guarantees of hiding Tor use from the ISP.
Īs for hiding Whonix ™ from network observers, this is a different subject which is covered on the Fingerprint page. The former version of this wiki page documenting some of the challenges in hiding Tor use from the ISP is still available here.
The technical discussion which lead to this conclusion can be found here. However, reliably hiding the type of any traffic (such as voice over IP or Tor) from the ISP in a threat model that includes endless data retention with retroactive policing is an even harder problem which is solved nowhere. Anonymizing internet traffic is a hard problem that for example Tor and Whonix ™ are working on.
It has been concluded this goal is difficult beyond practicality. It is impossible to Hide Tor use from the internet service provider (ISP).
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