Make your own decisions on what to use, how, and how much to use. But Google (Alphabet) is a data and marketing behemoth at the end of the day. Remember: Google products are free and mostly good enough. Then all get backed up in external drives and 'the cloud' (I use Mega.nz). The rest, I encrypt using 7z (similar to zip). Docs, spreadsheets, PDF's can all be encrypted natively by file as needed. My docs, spreadsheets, photos, videos, etc. The remaining 1%, I also delete after copying them over to docs or spreadsheets where I keep my things. As a retiree with no work files, 99% of my emails and texts don't need to be "memorialized" at all. I use some Google products (Gmail, Voice, Maps). The key to getting this system to work is persuading the majority of email users to accept and use MFA. This wouldn't be a problem for web-based mail, most already have limited user verification through credential many can use MFA. Second, each mailbox would need to be verified by its outgoing mail server. A mail server that lacks chain verification could be blocked. I'm thinking of a key exchange that would would work in combination with the mail server ip address.
Virtually all email messages sent today are in this category.įirst, this would require chain-certification of mail servers. Messages whose sender can't be positively authenticated should be categorized as suspicious by the recipient mail server. No one should be able to send messages without authentication of each message. We need some kind of permission system similar to STIR/SHAKEN.
IMO, what ls needed for email is what was needed once the phone system could no longer rely on physical wires to verify sender identity. That wouldn't work in the physical world and its analog won't work for email. You couldn't use this principle to control who couldn't deliver things, potentially bombs, into your house. It's like having a guard check a list of people who have robbed you before and use that list to deny those people entry. What we call privacy is security of self against intrusion.īlocking by instance is not a basic security strategy principle.
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